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DEPARTMENT FOR AF A/S FRAZER, AF S/E NATSIOS, AND AF/SPG  
NSC FOR PITTMAN AND HUDSON  
ADDIS ABABA ALSO FOR USAU

E.O. 12958: DECL: 11/25/2012

TAGS: [PREL](#) [MOPS](#) [KPKO](#) [UN](#) [AU](#) [SU](#)

SUBJECT: ADADA MOVES TO DEFUSE TENSION OVER KALMA IDP CAMP

Classified By: CDA Alberto Fernandez, Reason: Sections 1.4 (b) and (d)

¶1. (C) Joint Special Representative Rudolphe Adada and the AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS) are trying to broker a solution to mounting tensions in the Kalma internally displaced persons (IDP) camp in South Darfur, the JSR's chief of staff, Abdulrahman Abubakr, told Poloff on November 26. Following a November 14 letter from the Nyala police chief to the AMIS sector commander threatening to remove the weapons in the camp by November 30, Adada traveled to Nyala to meet with acting governor Farah Mustafa. AMIS has also dispatched a team to Jebel Marra to request Fur leaders' assistance in pressing the IDPs in Kalma to hand over their weapons voluntarily, according to Abubakr.

¶2. (C) While characterizing the Sudanese Government's concern about the militarization of Kalma's population as "somewhat legitimate", Abubakr agreed that direct Government intervention risked significant loss of life. AMIS is developing a plan to present to the South Darfur authorities within two days that it hopes will avoid a clash between Government forces and the IDPs. Though hesitant to discuss more than the broad outlines of AMIS' proposal before it is finalized, Abubakr emphasized that it would be vetted with humanitarian experts.

¶3. (C) Abubakr suggested that AMIS will first propose that Bangladeshi formed police units (FPU)--scheduled to deploy to Darfur within three to four days--provide security on the periphery of the camp in exchange for the IDPs' voluntary disarmament. If the IDPs reject this compromise, Abubakr said that AMIS would then consider disarming the IDPs directly. Poloff cautioned that direct AMIS intervention with the IDPs could be explosive. While Abubakr agreed, he said that the number of weapons in Kalma made the situation increasingly volatile, risking a serious confrontation not only between the Government and the IDPs but between the Fur and Zaghawa populations (this has already happened in Kalma recently when Zaghawa IDPs were expelled from the camp by Fur. These Zaghawa were then victimized a second time when GOS police forcibly removed them from Otash IDP camp, ostensibly at the request of camp members).

¶4. (C) Comment: Adada's proactive efforts to address this controversial are commendable. However, many IDPs argue that they need weapons to protect themselves against attacks from other tribes--both Arab and African--due to AMIS' inability to ensure their safety. Others are clearly rebel sympathizers seeking to use force to promote rebel leaders' sway in the camps (especially SLM leader Abdul Wahid Nur) as part of a campaign of armed struggle and destabilization. AID reports that as of November 25 the Sudanese Government has not conducted a sensitization campaign with deeply suspicious IDPs about its plans to disarm Kalma's population. Given the

hostility toward AMIS among Darfuris, particularly among the IDPs, an AMIS attempt to seize weapons in the camp could escalate into a violent confrontation between peacekeepers and IDPs and undermine the credibility of the UN-AU Mission in Darfur (UNAMID)--through its association with Adada--before it has deployed. We will continue to follow AMIS' attempts to defuse tensions prior to Charge Fernandez's planned visit to South Darfur on November 30 with the same goal and report septel. End comment.  
FERNANDEZ